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 RESTORING SEPARATION OF POWERS  
IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
 




This essay addresses the issue of how separation of powers relates to the 
domestic enforcement of international human rights standards in the face of 
opposition from the President.  Specifically, I consider the role of the 
judiciary in defending international human rights standards when the 
Executive branch invokes its ostensible foreign relations expertise against 
them.  
Nowhere has such conflict arisen more sharply than in the cases arising 
from the attacks of 9/11.  Three scenarios have stood out.  First, the 
President and Supreme Court have joined issue over statutes implicating 
human rights commitments. Notable in this regard is Justice Souter’s 
concurrence in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, in which he bolstered his reading of the 
Non-Detention Act with reference to Article 5 of the Third Geneva 
Convention.
1
 Second, the judiciary has challenged the executive more 
directly on issues of treaty interpretation.  In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Justice 
Stevens’ majority opinion summarily rejected the Bush administration’s 
idiosyncratic argument that “unlawful enemy combatants” were not entitled 
to the protections of the same treaties’ Common Article 3.2 Lastly, the 
Court has refused to set aside constitutional principles at the executive’s 
behest in the name of national security.  Not least, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
the Court rejected the President’s arguments for a restrictive reading of 
Guantanamo detainees’ Constitutional Due Process rights.3   Though here 
the parallel international standards operated offstage in U.S. Reports, they 
did make a significant appearance in amicus briefs.
4
  No less important, the 
                                                 
*
 Leitner Family Professor of International Human Rights Law, Fordham Law School; 
Visiting Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton 
University. 
1
 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 549–50 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part,  
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that even if Hamdi was not 
entitled to the protections of the Non-Detention Act, as the President claimed, he is entitled 
to the rights of a “prisoner of war” under Article 5 of the Geneva Convention). 
2
 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (rejecting the President’s determination 
that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention was inapplicable to members of al 
Qaeda). 
3
 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 524–35 (establishing that a citizen-detainee’s classification as an 
enemy combatant did not deprive him of the right to know the basis for his detention). 
4
 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Global Rights Supporting Petitioners, Hamdi, 542 
Winter 2012] RESTORING SEPARATION OF POWER IN  23 
 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
  
Court refused to consider only Article II’s national security concerns at the 
expense of the Fifth Amendment.
5
 
In short, the Court has stood up to the President to “say what the law is” 
even in foreign affairs areas that directly or indirectly implicate 
international human rights.
6
  However, any note of triumph, at least for 
advocates of human rights and judicial independence, would be premature.  
For one thing, the Court’s rulings rarely made any difference to the actual 
litigants.
7
 The 9/11 decisions could have gone further by referencing 
international standards more forcefully. More importantly, the decisions 
reflected a conflicted Court.  The rulings themselves were closely split, and 
the Court’s dicta emphasized deference to the Executive branch when the 
law implicates foreign relations concerns.
8
  
My contention is that to be faithful to the concept of separation of 
powers as it is implemented by the United States Constitution – and more 
generally applied by most governments around the world – domestic courts 
that are properly seized of applicable international human rights standards 
or that have the option to interpret the law with reference to these standards, 
should do so with zero deference to the views of the Executive branch.  This 
approach expands upon a long-standing project I have been undertaking that 
aims one day to appear as a monograph.
9
   
                                                                                                                            
U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696) (2004) (arguing that the government’s arbitrary detention of 
Hamdi violated U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and customary international law).  
5
 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535–39 (rejecting the Government’s assertion that the courts 
must defer to the Executive’s national security interests and forgo any examination of 
individual due process rights). 
6
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
7
 Martin S. Flaherty, Human Rights Law, American Justice, and the “War on Terror, 
25 OAH MAG. OF HIST., 35, 35–40 (2011).  
8
 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531 (plurality opinion) (stressing that the Constitution 
devolves responsibility over strategic wartime decisions to the Executive branch because it 
is best positioned and most politiclaly accounable for making such decisions); see also id. 
at 533–34 (plurality opinion) (allowing hearsay evidence and a rebuttable presumption in 
favor of the government’s position because enemy-combatant proceedings place a burden 
on the executive during military conflict); see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 679 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the Court has interpreted certain Article II provisions as bestowing 
broad powers on the President with respect to foreign relations and matters of national 
security).  
9
 See Martin S. Flaherty, More Real Than Apparent: Separation of Powers, The Rule 
of Law, and Comparative Executive “Creativity”in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 2005-2006 (2006) (exchange with John Yoo); see also Martin S. Flaherty, The Most 
Dangerous Branch Abroad, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2006) [exchange with Michael 
Ramsey]; see also Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Globalization in the Service of Self-
Government, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 477 (2006).  
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Given this focus, I do not discuss several issues.  Although I advocate 
for the United States to sign onto and ratify human rights treaties, I do not 
discuss these policy-making decisions here. Nor do I address the problem of 
reservations, understandings and declarations that curtail the applicability of 
those human rights norms, which I predictably oppose in most instances.  
With regard to both points, I am proud to channel the late, great Louis 
Henkin.
10
   
 
I. ZERO DEFERENCE: WHY COURTS SHOULD PERSEVERE IN THE 
INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
To illustrate my argument that courts should persevere in the 
interpretation of international law without deference to the executive 
branch, consider the following hypothetical. Imagine that the Court is 
making a decision regarding a controversial criminal statute.  It may be 
analyzing the statute’s constitutionality, applying canons of statutory 
interpretation or evaluating it with reference to customary international law. 
Now, let's say the Executive branch asserts that based on institutional 
capacity and expertise, the courts should not interpret the law 
independently.  Instead, courts should defer to the Executive branch’s 
interpretation of what the criminal law is in light of its unique and distinct 
expertise in criminal law enforcement. Compared to the sheltered courts, 
the Executive branch is more familiar with the reality of criminal law – the 
statistics behind the issues, the reality of dealing with criminals, and how 
the law operates in the real world.  
I would like to think that most people agree that this is a weak argument 
in the criminal law context.  We would expect and want courts to 
independently interpret criminal statutes or constitutional provisions with 
respect to criminal law.  That is, we expect the courts to interpret the law 
through conventional legal materials without any particular deference to the 
Executive branch or to those attempting to enforce the law.  Indeed, our 
instincts tell us that giving deference to the executive in that situation 
profoundly cuts against basic rule of law norms.  
Yet the Executive branch makes precisely the same argument when it 
comes to treaty interpretation, statutes and constitutional provisions relevant 
to international law.  The argument is that the executive branch has a 
distinct and unique institutional capacity to deal with foreign affairs and 
                                                 
10
 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990) (extolling domestic and 
transnational human rights enforcement).  
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foreign relations that deserves deference from the courts. In the 
international law context, this argument has not only long been treated as 
plausible, but, in dicta, seems to have been gaining on the Court itself – at 
least until the 9/11 cases.
11
   Moreover, versions of this approach have 
appeared across an array of doctrines implicating foreign relations matters.  
Deference to the executive has been floated not just with regard to statutes, 
treaties, and the Constitution, as noted.  It also appears in areas such as 
political question doctrine
12
 and sovereign immunity.
13
    
 
A.  Treaty Interpretation 
The argument with respect to treaty interpretation has been that courts 
need to defer to executive interpretations, even when they implicate 
individual rights.  Some commentators may argue that this claim has 
already more or less coalesced as doctrine.  A closer look at the case law, 
however, confirms that this assertion is more apparent than real.  In fact, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted treaties in an independent way using 
conventional interpretive materials.
14
  Only then has it occasionally added 
                                                 
11
 See Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Foreign Relations Authority After 9/11, 56 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 119, 151 (2011/2012) (referring to the weight of deferential entitlement that 
executive construction of rights rendered under the Geneva Convention). 
12
 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (compelling a suit to be non-justiciable 
due to the presence of a political question); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 
495 (1969) (presenting non-justiciable litigation in the court because of the involvement of 
a political question).  
13
 The Supreme Court suggested that the views of the State Department with regard to 
foreign sovereign immunity had special relevance. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 
2278, 2291 (2010) (holding that the State Department maintains a role in determining 
individual official immunity); see also Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35–
36 (1945) (suggesting that the courts respect the executive determination to treat a foreign 
vessel as immune, an idea that was later formalized in the “Tate Letter” (Letter of Jack B. 
Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, to the Acting Attorney General Phillip B. Perlman (May 19, 
1952), in 26 DEP’T STATE BULL 984 (1952)); see also Beth Stephens, The Modern 
Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2710 (2011) 
(evaluating the deference given to the Executive branch in determining foreign official 
immunity).    
14
 See Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 536, nn. 3–4 (1991) (suggesting that the 
simplest method of determining the proper meaning of a word in foreign legal text would 
be to consult a bilingual dictionary); see also Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 
457 U.S. 176, 184–85 n.4 (1982) (noting that the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by 
Government agencies is not conclusive; see also Anthony C. Arend, Who’s Afraid of the 
Geneva Conventions? Treaty Interpretation in the Wake of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 22 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV.709, 725–26 (2007) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s reasonably well-
established approach to treaty interpretation begins with giving words their ordinary 
meaning).   
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that its conclusions comport with what the executive branch has said, and 
that the executive’s views are owed some “weight.”15   That is why the 
doctrine currently remains more apparent than real.  Yet it is also a doctrine 
that appears en route to becoming more and more real, and so will likely do 
more and more work as time goes on.  That said, at least the terrorism cases 
suggest that this trend is not inexorable.  
There are two basic, yet very different sets of arguments against 
deference to the Executive branch in treaty interpretation, which combine to 
make what I believe is a dispositive case.  One set entails backward-looking 
reasons – in two words, original understanding.  The other involves 
forward-looking claims that in my mind are more novel and interesting.  In 
this regard, restoring to the courts a robust role in international human rights 
enforcement comports with a proper appreciation of recent ideas and 
analysis in international relations.   
 
1. Original Understanding:  the Founders as Internationalists 
With regard to original understanding, what must suffice for the 
moment is a grand conclusory assertion: the Founders were 
internationalists.  They were internationalists, in part because they were 
establishing what was at the time a weak would-be republic.  Then as now, 
such republics tend to like international law, which.  That commitment 
assumed special urgency under the Articles of Confederation.
16
  Though 
underappreciated today, one of the urgencies motivating constitutional 
reform in the 1780s was the states’ failure to implement domestic individual 
rights secured by international law – a failure that in turn threatened to 
plunge the new nation into renewed international hostilities.
17
  The result 
                                                 
15
 See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 355 (2006) (stating that although the 
Executive branch is afforded some weight, courts interpret treaties for themselves); see 
also Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Foreign Relations Authority After 9/11, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 119, 128 (2011/2012) (declaring that leading cases often give great weight to the 
executive interpretations of relevant treaties); see also Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty 
Interpretation, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 777, 779 (2008) (arguing that the current doctrine of 
judicial deference to executive treaty interpretation is “obtuse” and unclear).   
16
 See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulseboch, A Civilized Nation: The Early 
American Constitution, The Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 935 (2010) (asserting that the United States’ priority in 
constitution-making was to create a respectable nation in the eyes of the international 
community).    
17
 See JAMES A. CURRY, RICHARD B. RILEY & RICHARD M. BATTISONI, 
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 55–56 (5th ed. 2003) 
(describing state conditions and noting that the faiulre to secure individual rights led to 
reforms in the 1780s); see also Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, 
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was a Constitution with a central commitment to the enforcement of these 
norms by domestic courts.   
There are two striking examples, the most obvious of which is the 
Supremacy Clause.
18
   By this provision, the Founders sought to ensure that 
treaties would be self-executing – that is judicially enforceable – in Federal 
and state courts.  This approach came about as a direct response of the 
states’ refusal to implement not just any treaty, but the Treaty of Paris 
ending the War of Independence. Articles 4 and 6 of that Treaty established 
individual rights for British creditors and loyalists respectively.
19
 The other 
example comes from work by Professor David Sloss, which shows how the 
Supremacy Clause was implemented.
20
  Specifically, Sloss looks at treaty 
cases in the early Republic that involve denials by the executive that treaty-
based rights were infringed.  And in all of those cases, Sloss finds that in no 
case did the courts defer in any way to the Executive branch, either in word 
or deed.
21
    In short, to be true to our Founding ideas and practices, when it 
comes to the interpretation of international law properly before the courts – 
especially with regard to individual rights claims – the executive is entitled 
to exactly zero deference. 
 
2. Imbalance of Power: The Executive in International Relations 
Now consider the “forward-looking” international relations concept.  





 and Anne-Marie Slaughter.
24
   In various ways, they have 
explored the insight that it not longer suffices to think of foreign affairs as 
primarily that story of sovereign nation states acting upon one another as 
                                                                                                                            
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2122–23, 2125 (1999) (arguing that 
domestic misapprehensions in the treaty-making process may have affected the body’s role 
in foreign affairs).   
18
 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
19
 See THE DEFINITIVE TREATY OF PEACE, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 4, art. 6, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 
Stat. 80 (declaring that creditors right to collect debts shall be valid but prosecutions and 
confiscations relating to the Revolutionary War shall cease and be void).    
20
 See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A 
Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 495, 498–99 (2007) (positing that, in 
relation to Executive authority, the Judiciary has exhibited zero deference to the Exeuctive 
branch in the first decades of the Republic).     
21
 See id. (contending that the Constitution does not require the judiciary to defer to the 
executive branch on issues of treaty interpretation).    
22
 See ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: 
WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION (1977). 
23
 See id.   
24
 See ANN-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).  
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monoliths.  Instead, they argue, sovereignty has become increasingly 
disaggregated.  By this they mean that more and more the key interactions 
between nations come at the level of governmental sub-units: executive 
regulators, judges, and legislators.  And those sub-units tend to track the 
classic division found in the separation of powers.  
Start with the executive. Increasingly, nation states interact via members 
of their Executive branches, not on the cabinet level, but instead on the level 
of regulators, administrators, and enforcement officers.
25
  In simplest terms, 
such officials meet simply to network, or to use a New York term, 
“schmooze.”  Often they share information to aid in respective rules 
generation or enforcement.  At times they form or make use of 
organizations on a sub-cabinet level.  
Judges, too, directly interact with one another across borders.  This also 
involves schmoozing, through international get-togethers such as the Aspen 
Institute or through various academic venues, such as those run for 
Ghanaian judges by the Leitner Center in New York.  An even more 
prominent method is what one might call the “international shout out,” 
through judges citing one another’s case law.  Some courts and judges are 
routinely cosmopolitan; others less so.
26
   Yet even among U.S. judges, who 
tend to be on the less internationalist side, the practice appears here to 
stay.
27
 Regardless of the method, judicial globalization, as executive 
globalization, permits sharing of information and expertise with a resulting 
mutual empowerment. 
Legislators participate in this type globalization as well.  They too 
travel, meet with their counterparts, share information, and at times 
undertake joint initiatives.  Here, however, collective action problems and 
party turnover tend to diffuse the benefits to respective legislative bodies.  




Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in 
Financial Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 243, 254 
(2010) (explaining that states are disaggregating into functionally distinct parts such as 
courts, regulatory agencies, and legislatures in order to deal with global issues); see also 
David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 575 (2008) (claiming that networks allow domestic officials to interact 
with their foreign counterparts directly, without the need for supervision by foreign offices 
or senior Executive branch officials). 
26
 For an example from one of the more cosmopolitan courts, see Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs, [2011] H.K.C.F.A.R., Final Appeals Nos. 5, 6, & 
7 of Civil 2010 (CFA) (Bokhary, J.).    
27
 See Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Globalization in the Service of Self-Government, 20 
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 477, 491 (2006) (recognizing that US judges are increasingly looking 
to international materials in deciding domestic cases); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1003, 1117–19 (2000) (discussing several U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices’ tendencies to use foreign law as persuasive authority).   
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Legislative bodies are simply too large and too unstable for interaction 
between legislators to result in benefits on the same scale as with the 
administrators and judges.
28
   
For all their insight, there is one thing international relations scholars do 
not ask, and that is how these different sub-units of any given government 
fare relative to one another in light of the type of globalization they 
describe.  Put in more conventional legal terms: How does modern 
international relations affect the balance among the branches of government 
that is at the core of separation of powers?  That question is critical to the 
extent any constitutional democracy embraces the doctrine.  It is therefore 
important even in parliamentary systems, insofar as judicial authority is 
meant to serve as a counterbalance to the usual mixture of legislative and 
executive authority evident in a ministerial government comprised of 
legislators.  The question becomes even clearer in a system like the United 
States, in which the legislature, executive, and judiciary are designed to be 
relatively independent and co-equal.
29
  
My increasingly educated guess is that the relative winner emerging 
from modern foreign relations are executives the world over.  They are 
better placed to interact with, and so empower, one another than reactive 
judiciaries, which remain generally reactive, or legislatures, which suffer 
from obvious collective action problems.  Concerns borne of 9/11 have only 
strengthened the executive hand that much more, as is true any time 
national security fears spike.  Running substantially behind in second, it 
turns out, is the judiciary, which appears to be less hampered by collective 
action difficulties than legislatures.  Which means that lawmakers come in a 
far distant third and last place.   
As a descriptive matter, then, international relations disproportionately 
enhance executive power, at the expense of legislative as well as judicial 
power, throughout the world.  Two aspects of this phenomenon should 
cause concern, if not alarm, especially in combination.  First, 
globalization’s comparative enhancement of executive authority comes in a 
context in which at least the American executive is powerful well beyond 
any original expectations, and has been augmenting power at a dizzying 
rate.
30
   
                                                 
28
 See ANN-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 106 (2004) (acknowledging 
the difficulty in achieveing cohesiveness among legislators on a global scale). 
29
 See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1784 
(1996) (describing how the Constitutionally mandated separation of powers serves 
fundamental goals of balance,  accountability and improves government efficiency). 
30
 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE END OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 84 (2010) 
(highlighting the growing power of the Executive branch); see also Aida Torres Perez, The 
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Which at last brings me to my normative conclusion.  Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, the last rather than first place that courts should defer 
to the executive is in cases in which the law implicates foreign relations.  
That conclusion follows from venerable tenets of separation of powers that 
we have somehow forgotten, as well as modern pressures on that doctrine 
that we do not yet fully appreciate.  Today, we must recall that among the 
preeminent Founding ideas was a basic balance among the branches, not to 
mention primacy in their respective fields, and that this conception was held 
nowhere more strongly than in relation to judicial resolution of legal matters 
affecting foreign relations.  We need to appreciate that the dynamics of 
modern foreign relations work to further empower executives in general, 
and the American executive in particular, exacerbating an imbalance that 
has already long been pronounced. 
The time to learn these lessons is now.  Already the courts have parroted 
presidentialist rhetoric concerning judicial foreign affairs rhetoric.  But they 
have yet to make that rhetoric a reality.  Should they do so, one more key 
check on executive power will have been discarded in an area in which it 
was supposed to have been entrenched, and in which it has never been 
needed more.  Checks such as judicial independence in foreign relations 
may be destined to pass away.  Yet as Justice Jackson proclaimed, “it is the 
duty of the Court to be the last, not the first, to give them up.”31  
 
 
                                                                                                                            
Internationalization of Lawmaking Processes: Constraining or Empowering the 
Executive?, 14 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 8–9 (2006) (stating that internationalization 
provides a unique opportunity for the expansion of the Executive branch power). 
31
 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 634, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (emphasizing the importance of maintaining checks on executive power). 
